Strategic blowback
Paul Rogers' latest column brilliantly exposes the madness behind the recently articulated National Security Strategy of the United States.
First, he breaks down the strategy by identifying its four key claims:
- 1. The US should actively try to shape the 21st century in its own "political and economic image."
2. Whoever resists this mission should be viewed as a "threat both to the United States and its allies and to the world as a whole."
3. It will sometimes be necessary to "pre-empt the rise to power" of other states or movements which serve to challenge – directly or indirectly – premise #1.
4. This requires that the US maintain, by far, the world's strongest, most technologically advanced military, ready to strike wherever and whenever it is deemed necessary.
After this brief sketch, he goes on to define the one major "catch in all of this: namely, that the policy itself is likely to prove deeply and persistently counter-productive."
For a state such as Iran, and for at least half a dozen others, a US state policy of this kind, with its parallel military power, makes it far more necessary to acquire deterrent forces, whether these be missiles or biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. True, they will have to be produced in conditions of great secrecy, but in the face of US military power they will be seen as essential – they will become the weapons of the underdog.This is an exceptional insight. It articulates exactly why the NSS is self-defeating, and how it will make the world a much more dangerous place. A few other commentators, like Paul Kennedy, have offered similar analyses, but none as clearly as Rogers here.
We therefore end up in the extraordinary position that US attempts to control opposition by military means will simply encourage opponents to redouble their efforts to protect themselves and deter such attacks. They will be aided by many states that may not be implicitly opposed to the US but are more than happy to aid those who see themselves as threatened. Serbia may aid Iraq with upgraded radar systems, China may help Iraq with military communications and Pakistan with its nuclear programme. Pakistan, in turn, may help North Korea with nuclear facilities, and North Korea is meanwhile in the business of selling missiles to Syria and Iran.
...Furthermore, states facing the United States and its allies will do everything they can in order not to have to face the direct use of military power. Every asymmetric warfare method available, whether it be sabotage, paramilitary attacks, support for radical movements or any other tactic – all will be seen as essential for their own security.
On 11 September 2001, al-Qaida found one weak point, exploited it with remarkable ability and executed it with terrible consequences. Since then, al-Qaida has dispersed, it has resisted every attempt to destroy it, it is emerging with most, if not all, of its capabilities intact, and it seems to have as much support as ever.
The end result of the Bush security posture is to establish a broadly-based ‘us versus them’ polarisation, in the belief that this is the only way to ensure the New American Century. In practice it encourages exactly the opposite – a widespread and growing opposition in which every means will be found to counter US power. In such a situation, the United States itself will actually end up less secure, although it may take years for this to be recognised.
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