The UN Façade

In a piece written for Tom Dispatch.com, Michael Klare argues that Bush made the decision to go to war in late August 2002, knowing that the earliest time the US could have troops in place and ready to strike would be late February or early March of this year.

It was only after making this decision, and because he knew he had to wait some six months before the war could even kick off, that Bush decided to give the UN a shot. According to Klare, Bush knew that "he had nothing to lose" by going to the UN, and much to gain. Most importantly, an appeal to the UN "allowed him to quiet those domestic critics (including some senior Republicans) who felt that a veneer of international support was necessary to lend a degree of legitimacy to the planned U.S. invasion."

"Clearly," Klare writes, "it has been the pacing of U.S. war preparations and not the political environment at the United Nations that has shaped Administration strategy over the past few months. Until now, the White House has been able to conceal this underlying reality because so many eyes were focused on developments in New York. Once the fighting begins, however, the outright cynicism and deceitfulness of the U.S. strategy will quickly become apparent, further turning world opinion against the United States."

Klare is wrong on this last point, though. The "outright cynicism and deceitfulness of the U.S. strategy" is already shockingly apparent, and has been for several months.